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WEAPON, BUT WILL IT SUCCEE
MISSOURI
by Don Willol and Tom Collins
1. INTRODUCTION
"Environmental justice" is the term
used to define the legal and social
movement to redistribute the benefits and
burdens of policies that have environ-
mental implications.' Wade Henderson,
director of the Washington office of the
National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP), has
been quoted as saying that environ-
mental justice is "... the cutting edge of
a new civil rights struggle.- 2 While envi-
ronmental justice is a broad term that
has been used to cover such various so-
cietal issues as nuclear waste disposal,
international trade agreements and haz-
ordous waste siting policies,3 this paper
will focus solely on the latter.
In Missouri, as well as throughout the
United States, the vast majority of haz-
ardous waste treatment, storage and dis-
posal facilities (TSDs) are in
predominantly minority neighborhoods.
Although several studies have concluded
that discrimination plays a rol
siting of TSDs, these studies hc
challenged as incomplete or ina
Partly as a result of this confl
search, lawsuits alleging that
cilities have been placed in
neighborhoods for discriminat
sons have been largely unsucces
Advocates of the environm
tice movement believe that Title
1964 Civil Rights Act provides
with a weapon to challenge siti
tices that they view as discrim
Title VI has not yet been used as
of action in this context. Prese
the Equal Protection and Taking
of the Constitution, and Title V
1964 Civil Rights Act have be
by plaintiffs in this context, but
limited success.7
This paper provides backgr
formation on the disproportionat
placed on minority communities
erence to several studies, inclu
analysis of Missouri sites. 11 then exam-TSD ines proposed legislation and case law
attempting to deal with the problem, em-
phasizing cases using the EqualTHE Protection clause of the United States
Constitution. Other alternatives are also
BEST discussed. Using these cases, this paperattempts to predict the advantages and
limitations of Title VI as a cause of ac-D IN tion. The paper suggests that alleging a
Title VI violation in factual contexts where
Title VI has not been previously used is
likely to lead to conflicting court dec
sions and uncertainty that will do little to
promote environmental justice in the sit-
ing of hazardous waste facilities. To
achieve environmental justice, in the sit-
ing of hazardous waste facilities, Con-
e in the gress and state legislatures will have to
~ve been take the issue away from the courts by
ccurate. enacting legislation that provides a
icting re- -mechanism to ensure the even distribu-
vaste fa- tion of benefits and burdens.
minority
ory reo- 1 ACGON
sful.5  In 1971, Environmental Protection
)ntal jus- Agency (EPA) head William Ruckelshaus
VI of the publicly stated that even though the
plaintiffs agency had at its disposal a powerful
ng prac- enforcement tool, Title VI of the 1964
inatory. 6Civil Rights Act, the EPA would not use it
a cause because it was not relevant to its mission
ntly, only of cleaning up the environment.8 Since
s clauses that fateful declaration, the environmental
II of the concerns and problems of minority cam-
.en used munities largely have been ignored by
with very the EPA, the judicial system, and the
American political process. The conse-
ound in- quences of this EPA policy have been
e burden dramatic, as several studies have
with ref- shown.9 In 1983, the General Account-
ding an ing Office (GAO) published one of the
1 This new area of law bears a variety of names- most commonly, environmental racism, environmental justice, and environmental equity. Richard J. Lazarus,
Pursuing "Environmentallustice": The Distribunonal Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. R Ev. 787, 790(1993).
Marcia Coyle & Marianne Lavelle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide In Environmental low -A Special Invesigatlon, NArt J., Sept. 21, 1992 at S2.
Lazarus, supro note 1, at 790.
4 Id at 796.
Id.
6 Id. at 834.
7 See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. See also inro note 105.
8 Hearings Before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 146.56 (1971) (testimony of William Rucketshous, Administrator of the United States Environmental
Protection Agencyl.
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first studies of how environmental mis-
management affected various popula-
tiongroups. After surveying hazardous
waste sites in the southeastern United
States,io the GAO reported that African-
Americans made up the majority of the
population in three of four waste site
Oreas.1l
An oft-referred to study conducted by
the United Church of Christ Commission
for Racial justice (UCC) followed the
GAO report in 1987. The UCC study
examined population centers with two or
more hazardous waste facilities or one
of the five largest landfills and found a
mean minority population of 35%.12
Population centers without similar envi-
ronmental hazards had a mean minority
population of 12%.13
In a 1992 report, the National Law
Journal (NU) surveyed 1177 Superfund
toxic waste sites. The NLJ reported that
placement on the Superfund list was
faster for sites in white communities than
in non-white communities; cleanups were
faster in white communities; and penal-
ties were higher in predominantly white
areas than in non-white areas." For
instance, the average Resource Conser-
vation Recovery Act (RCRA) fine imposed
on areas with a predominantly while
population was $335,566, compared
to $55,318 in black neighborhoods.Is
As a result of these studies and changes
in the political climate, the EPA is play-
ing catch-up and will soon be a major
player in the new environmental lustice
arena.16
The EPA has quietly signaled its
break with the policy of the Ruckelshous
years that civil rights had little relevance
in an environmental context. The direc-
tor of the EPA's new Office of Environ-
mental Equity, Dr. Clarice Gaylord,
stated in March of 1993 that neither
EPA policy nor the agency's interpreta-
tion of existing precedent stood in the
way of civil rights-based environmental
suits. 17  Dr. Gaylord also claimed that
her office was "re-visiting" civil rights
statutes as a means of enforcing environ-
mental justice.18
Congress has made several start-and-
stop attempts to forge an environmental
justice policy. In 1992, now Vice-
president Al Gore and Representative
John Lewis introduced the "Environmental
Justice Act of 1992" in both the House
and the Senate." The bill failed to
pass, but spurred the introduction of on-
other bill, Senate Bill 171. This bill
passed the Senate in May 1993, and
called for the elevation of the EPA to
cabinet-level status.20 One of the major
provisions of the bill was to create a
new Office of Environmental Justice2i in
an effort to improve EPA's response to
environmental racism problems.Y The
counterpart to that bill in the House, H.R.
3425, cleared the House Government
Operations Committee on November 4,
1993." The EPA Cabinet bill was with-
drawn in Feburary 1994 after the Demo-
cratic leadership failed to pass a rule
limiting floor amendments to the bill.24
The Clinton Administration also has
become a player. The While House is
currently working on drafts of an execu-
tive order purported to require acceler-
ated use of Title VI as a means of
removing environmental burdens felt une-
qually by minority communities.25 The
administration apparently feels a sense
of urgency. A White House spokesper-
son pointed out that an executive order
is more advantageous than legislation
because of its relative speedin
implementation. 26
President Clinton signed Executive
Order No. 12898 on February 11,
1994, directing EPA and other agencies
to identify and address the
"disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of
its programs, policies, and activities." 27
The order has been criticized as ineffec-
tive for a number of reasons, but primar-
ily because it does not address what is a
disproportionate effect.28 The order will
9 See intro notes 10 and 12.
1o U.S. GEN. AccouNuNo OFRCE, SITNG OF HAzADOus WASTE LANDRts AND THBR COREA1iONWH RAQA AND EcONoMIc STus oF SunOUNDING CoawuNms 111983).
1 Id. See Robert D. Bullard, Examining the Evidence of Environmental Racism, 2 LAND USE FoRuM 6 (Winter 1993) (explaining the GAO Report).
12 UnED CHURCH OF Ca-PsT COMMISSION FOR RAcAJusETcE, Tonc WASTEs AND RACE N TH UMTED SWEs: A NAioNAi REPORT ON THE RACAL AND SOOOECONOMIC CHAPACTETS1ICS
OF CCAUNITIES WiHHAZARDOUS WASTE SITEs (1987).
13 Id.
14 Coyle & Lavelle, supro note 2, at S2.
15 Id.
16 id.
17 Stephen C. Jones, Inequities of Industrial Siting Addressed, NAT1 ., Aug. 16, 1993, ot 20.
1s Environmental Equity -House Considers Need for Bill to Combat Racism, BNA NAT't ENv. DARY, March 8, 1993.
19 S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) and H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
20 Senate Votes to Elevate Agency to President's Cabinet, Eliminate CEO, BNA NAI'L ENv. DAtty, May 5, 1993.
21 Id
22 Cabinet Status, Environmentalustice VWill improve Agency, Former Official Says, BNA NAT Eiv. DaY, Nov. 8, 1993 (reporting comments by F. Henry Habicht,
former deputy EPA administrator).
23 Bill to Elevate EPA to Cabinet level Clears Government Operations Committee, BNA NAr'l Erw. DAy, Nov. 8, 1993 [hereinafter Bill to Evaluate EPA]
24 EPA: House Overturns EPA Cabinet Bill Rule, leadership Pulls Bill, Next Step Unclear, BNA NAf'L ENv. DAny, Feb. 4, 1994.
2 Congressionol Black Caucus Seminar Says Research, Immediate Action Needed, BNA NAt'L ENv. DAmy, Sept. 20, 1993 [hereinafter Black Caucus Seminar].
26 Bill to Elevate EPA, supro note 23.
v Exec. Order No. 12.898 (1994).
29 EnvironmentalJustice: Difficulty Predicted for Demonstrating Ellectiveness of Clinton Executive Order, BNA NAT'L ENv. DaY, Dec. 8, 1994.
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give EPA no legal basis for denying a
hazardous waste permit based on a
finding of environmental inequity
alone.29
Ill. MISSOURI SITES
A brief examination of Missouri sites
yields interesting results. The 1990 Cen-
sus Bureau reported that Missouri had a
white population of 87.67% and a non-
white population (including African-
Americans, American Indians, Asians,
Hispanics, and "others") of 1 2.33%.'o
According to the Missouri Department of
Natural Resources (MDNR), however, in
the population centers nearest the fifty-
five sites on Missouri's Registry of Uncon-
trolled or Abandoned Hazardous Waste
Sites, 69.45% of the population is white
and 30.55% is non-white. 1 Of the fifty-
five sites, twelve exist in the more
crowded and predominantly non-white
urban areas of St. Louis, Missouri, and
Kansas City, Missouri.3
Currently, according to the MDNR,
fifty active or proposed TSD hazardous
waste facilities exist in Missouri. Of
those sites, twentyfour are commercial
facilities33 and twenty-six sites are
private.34 Of the twenty-four commercial
sites, seven (29.17%) are in the metro-
politan Kansas City, Missouri area.3s
Of the twenty-six private sites, nine
(34.62%) are located in the metropolitan
St. Louis or Kansas City areas. 6
The five active or proposed sites in
the St. Louis metropolitan area are pri-
vate facilities, three of which are in pre-
dominantly non-white communities.3
The site with the smallest non-white popu-
lation is the Mallinckrodt waste facility at
Mallinckrodt and 2nd Streets, where the
immediate surrounding community is
58.42% non-white." The site with the
largest non-white population is the GMC
Truck and Bus facility at Natural Bridge
and Union, where 98.92% of the popu-
lation is non-white.3' The other two sites
in the St. Louis metropolitan area are in
predominantly while communities, but
the non-white population is still greater
than the state overage of 1 2.3 3%.40
Interestingly, of the five St. Louis sites, the
GMC Truck and Bus site affects the larg-
est number of people and also has the
highest minority population.41
Of the sites in Kansas City, 2 only
one of the ten is in a community where
the minority population is 50% or
greater. The communities surrounding six
of the ten sites, however, have a minority
population greater thanthe state overage
of 12.33%."' The site surrounded by
the largest population is 46.2% non-
white.44 Analysis of the Kansas City
and St. Louis sites suggests that the ra-
ciol composition of the population is re-
lated in some way to the location of the
hazardous waste sites.As
This survey of Missouri sites is only a
primitive indication that racial inequities
may exist in siting policies. Clearly, more
research is needed to establish causal
links between siting policies and the
groups that are most harmed by them.46
The director of the National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences recently
told the Congressional Black Caucus
that the institute had committed to spend
$30 million in the next five years on such
studies. Despite this commitment of
resources, several speakers at the same
seminar stated their belief that much
more research would still be needed. 8
One of those speakers, Ted Show of the
NAACP's Legal and Educational De-
fense Fund, cautioned that the lack of
2 Id.
3 U.S. BUREAUOF TK CENSUS, STAT AND METROPOuAN AREA DATA Boox, 199111991).
' Missouri Registry of Uncontrolled and Abandoned Hazardous Waste Sites.
32 d.
3 Facilities that receive compensation for management/disposal of other producers' wastes. Id.
34 Facilities that manage/dispose of their own wastes -some of these are owned by such well-known names such as American Cyanamid, Dow Chemical, GMC,
Mallinckrod, McDonnell-Douglas, and Raiston-Purina. Id.
3 Id.
3 Id.
' The population breakdowns around these sites were computed at one square mile by the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council in St. Louis. Easi-Wes
Galeway based their computations on ihe 1990 Census Bureau Report.
o Id.
3 Id.
20.66% oF the population is nonwhite in the area surrounding the Sigma site at Utah and South 2nd, and 20.30% of the population is non-white surrounding the
other Sigma site at Pontiac and Dekalb. Id.
' 29,126 people live within one square mile of the GMC site. The next highest population concentration is the Sigma site at Pontiac and Dekolb, where 18,563
people live within one square mile of the hazardous waste site. Id.
' Information for the Kansas City sites was prepared by ihe MidAmerica Regional Council, 600 Broadway, Kansas City, Missouri.
43 Id.
" Id.
4 In rural Missouri, the statistics indicate that income, rather than race, plays a role in siting policy. For example, the average while population surrounding the
seventeen rural, private sires is 93.20% of the total. In eight of those seventeen areas, the percentage of families tha have an income below the poverty tine ,
exceeds the stlate sublpoverty line percentage. The average while population surrounding the seventeen rural, commercial sites is 92.48 %. In ten of those areas, the
percentage of families that'have an income below the poverty line exceeds the state subpoverty line percentage.
' Black Caucus Seminar, supro note 25, of 1.
o Id. (paraphrasing a statement by Kenneth Olden, director of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences).
48 Id.
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definitive studies should not be used as
an excuse to delay efforts to begin ad-
dressing these inequities immediately.
Mr. Show called for more active enforce-
ment of already existing state and fed-
eral laws, specifically urging the EPA to




Few cases have focused on environ-
mental racism issues. In 1971, the same
year William Ruckelshaus told Congress
that the EPA had little relationship with
the civil rights movement, a local environ-
mental group sought to enjoin federal,
state, and local governments from con-
structing an interstate highway through
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.50  In Harris-
burg Coalition Against Ruining the Envi-
ronment v. Volpe, the Coalition alleged
that the highway's construction in the
predominantly African-American area of
Harrisburg would constitute a violation
of the residents' Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection rights and the 1964
Civil Rights Act.5' The Coalition pre-
sented evidence that the planned path
for the highway was through a park
used predominantly by blocks and that it
was this reason that the park was al-
lowed to deteriorate.52 The District
Court found that the evidence offered by
the Coalition was insufficient to sustain
either claim."
The Supreme Court addressed the
issue in Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Corp.54 This 1977
decision made clear that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would not be the best weapon to
win environmental racism suits.ss In that
case, Metropolitan Housing Corp. al-
leged that its request to rezone a portion
of Arlington Height as a multi-family
dwelling was denied for discriminatory
reasons.56 The Court found for Arlington
Heights, holding that Metropolitan's sta-
tistical proof, offered to show a dispa-
rate impact on African-Americans, was
not enough by itself to substantiate a
Fourteenth Amendment claim.57  The
Court required some proof of intent to
constitute a showing of the "invidious
racial discrimination" needed to succeed
in a Fourteenth Amendment claim.58
The first suit to deal with discrimina-
tory disposal facility siting policies, de-
cided in 1979, was Beon
v.Southwestern Waste Management
Corp.s9 In that case, Bean alleged that
the Texas Department of Health (TDH)
granted a permit to construct a solid
waste disposal plant in Bean's neighbor-
hood primarily because the proposed
site was predominantly populated by
African-Americans.60 The federal district
court found that the statistical proof of-
fered by Bean was not enough to show
that TDH had engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination.61  The court
based its ruling on, evidence that of the
seventeen solid waste sites in Houston
operated by the TDH, 82.4% of the sites
were located in areas where minorities
comprised 50% or less of the popula-
tion.62 The court left open the possibility
that discrimination may be shown with
"more particularized data" that would
suggest the actual neighborhoods af-
fected by the sites were predominantly
minority-populated."
Three cases heard in Florida federal
courts suggest a more successful form of
attack on environmental racism." The
plaintiffs in all three cases alleged that
the allocation of municipal services had
a disparate impact on minorities. The
plaintiffs offered as proof evidence that
the bulk of the services provided went to
predominantly white neighborhoods.s
Beginning in 1981, with Dowdell v.
City of Apopka, Fla., the plaintiffs as-
serted that the City failed to pave roads,
install storm water drainage facilities,
install sewerage facilities, and to provide
parks and recreation facilities in black
neighborhoods in the same manner as
provided in white neighborhoods." The
plaintiffs argued this constituted a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause and of Title VI of
the 1964 Civil RightsAct.67 The district
court found that an inference of
' Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe, 330 F.Supp. 918, 921 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
51 Id.
2 td. o 926.
53 Id.





s9 482 F.Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
6 Id at 674-75.
61 Id. at 677.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Dovdell v. City of Apopka, Fla., 511 F.Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, Fla., 645 F.Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986; Ammons v. Dade
City, Fla., 783 F.2d 982 (11 ih Cir. 1986).
6 Dowdell, 51 F.Supp. at 1377; Baker, 645 F.Supp. at 572; Ammons, 783 F.Supp. al 1289.
6 Dowdell, 511 F.Supp. at 1377.
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discrimination could be drawn in this
case."6 The court pointed to evidence
offered that Apopka had historically re-
sponded more favorably to requests by
white residents for services and that
blacks were under-represented in the
city's government and administration.6"
The court granted the plaintiffs' injunctive
relief under both claims.70 Significantly,
the court noted that while the plaintiffs
here had shown an intent to discrimi-
nate, some courts had interpreted Title VI
to allow proof of discrimination upon a
showing of "discriminatory effect"
alone."
In 1986, another class of plaintiffs in
Baker v. City of Kissimmee, claimed that
the discriminatory deprivation of munici-
pal services had violated their Fourteenth
Amendment rights.n In this case, how-
ever, the plaintiffs made no Title VI
claim.73  The plaintiffs prevailed after
proving first, a disparate impact and
then, the existence of other factors74 that
allowed the court to conclude discrimina-
tory intent was present in the allocation
of the services.75 The court noted the
necessity for proof of intent to sustain a
Fourteenth Amendment claim, but said
nothing about Title VI requirements.'
Continuing in 1986, the decision in
an another successful municipal services
case, Ammons v. Dade City, Fla., was
upheld when the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals refused to overturn the district
court's finding of intentional discrimina-
tion as clearly erroneous. 7 On facts
similar to Dowdell, the appellate court
agreed with the district court that the evi-
dence7 offered at trial was enough to
show a disparate impact and found the
requisite "correlation between municipal
services disparities and racially tainted
purposiveness" sufficient for a finding of
discriminatory intent.79  This court re-
stated the principle, however, that im-
pact alone was not enough to prove
intent.80 Notably, the plaintiffs in this
case never plead a violation of Title VI,
but only of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
Consequently, there is no conflict be-
tween Ammons, Baker, and Dowdell as
to the Dowdell court's statement that im-
pact alone may be enough in Title VI
cases.
Returning to disposal facility siting
policies, the plaintiffs in the 1989 case
of East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood v.
Macon-Bibb Planning, alleged violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Con-
stitution.82 The allegations stemmed from
Macon-Bibb County's grant of a condi-
tional use permit to a waste landfill
operator, Mullis Tree Service, Inc." The
plaintiffs complained that Macon-Bibb
issued permits to build the landfill in a
largely African-American community, re-
sulting in a discriminatory impact on that
community." The Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's ruling against
the plaintiffs, finding that while plaintiffs
may have had a cause of action under
the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs did
not offer sufficient evidence of an
"improper racial animus" that would sat-
isfy the intent requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment.85
Another direct attack on a county's
landfill siting policies likewise failed in
R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay.86 The plaintiffs of-
fered evidence that King and Queen
County of Virginia obtained a purchase
option to buy land near a predominantly
black area and that this land was to be
used as a landfill site. Plaintiffs also of-
fered evidence of the historically dispo-
rate treatment of area blacks.87 Citing
Arlington Heights, the court noted that
evidence of disparate impact is not




n Baker, 645 F.Supp. at 572.
72Id.
n The other factors cited by the Baker court are the reasonable foreseeability of a discriminatory impact, Ihe legislative and administrative history of the service
allocation policies, and knowledge of a discriminatory impact on ihe minority residents. Id. at 588.
7 Id.
76 Id.
'" Ammons, 783 F.2d at 982.
' The factual findings of she district court cited by the Ammons court were that: 1) Dade City's assessment policy was neither uniform as to its application nor
inclusive of all city streets; 2) liens were never collected on a significant portion of the streets assessed; 3) black citizens in one subdivision were required to pay
assessments in advance of paving, while no while residents were required 10 pay in advance at any time. Ammons v. Dade City, Fla., 594 F.Supp 1274, 1289(M.D. Fla. 1984).
' Ammons, 783 F.2d at 987 (quoting Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (11 th Cir. 1983).
8 Ammons, 783 F.2d at 988.
a' id.
8 896 F.2d 1264 (11 Ith Cir. 1989).
3 Id.
* Id.
" Id. at 1266 (quoting the district court in East Bibb-Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commission, 706 F.Supp 880, 887
(M.D. Ga. 1989). The Fointeenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim was apparently the only claim that survived to be heard on its merits; the 42 U.S.C.
and Filth Amendment claims apparently failed on procedural grounds.
' 768 F.Supp 1141 (E.D. Va. 1991).
7 1d.at11I43.
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enough to maintain a constitutional rights
claim." The court also denied the plain-
tiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim, that
they deserved protection of their property
values or their general health and envi-
ronmental well-being. The court found
that "...the Equal Protection Clause does
not impose an affirmative duty to equal-
ize the impact of official decisions on
different racial groups. Rather, it merely
prohibits government officials from inten-
tionally discriminating on the basis of
race."89 The court seemed persuaded
by evidence that the defendants, King
and Queen County Board of Supervi-
sors, made efforts to prevent any signifi-
cant damage or interference to the black
community.9o
As the foregoing discussion illustrates,
the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment often has been used
by plaintiffs in attempts to achieve envi-
ronmental equity. With the exception of
the Florida municipal services cases, the
Equal Protection Clause has been largely
unsuccessful. The primary difficulty with
maintaining such a suit is meeting the
high level of proof, a showing of inten-
tional discrimination, required by
Arlington Heights." This level of proof is
difficult for a plaintiff to meet when the
alleged cause of the harm is an
environmental imbalance, especially
when there is no statistically significant
basis for the imbalance, or when there is
no documentation that the involved
environmental agency or governmental
entity has a historic practice of
discrimination.92
While evidence of environmental im-
pact is insufficient, in and of itself, to
maintain a Fourteenth Amendment claim,
courts have allowed the introduction of
such evidence as a "starting point"
which can be bolstered with additional
evidence, such as: 1) the effect of the
"official action"; 2) the historical back-
ground of the decision; 3) the specific
sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision; 4) any departures
from normal procedures; 5) any depar-
ture from normal substantive criteria; and
6) the administrative history of the deci-
sion. Unless one or more of these fac-
tors are present, a court is not likely to
find the requisite intent.93 The lack of
success of these suits suggests that the
courts consider this to still be a lofty pin-
nacle of proof to reach. The Arlington
Heights test has the practical effect of
making environmental equity suits based
on the Equal Protection Clause
unwinnable.'
Many states have an equal protec-
tion clause similar to that in the federal
Constitution. The task here is to find if
the clause has been interpreted by the
state courts or legislatures to allow a
showing of intent based on impact
alone. Missouri's equal protection
clause reads "[AIIl persons are created
equal and are entitled to equal rights
and opportunity under the law."95 No
Missouri cases have interpreted this
clause in the environmental equity con-
text, but two cases suggest Missouri's
equal protection clause requires proof of
discriminatory intent.6
B. Title VIII
Some commentators have suggested
that Title VIll of the Civil Rights Act, also
known as the Fair Housing Act, may be
a more successful approach. Title Vili
bars discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, familial statusor no-
tional origin in the sale or rental of a
dwelling or in providing related serv-
ices."e There is much confusion as what
constitutes a claim under Title VIll.
Courts have yet to adequately define
"services or facilitiles" and who qualifies
as a potentially liable deliverer of those
services."
The most significant advantage of
Title VllI is that discriminatory impact
alone may be sufficient to establish liabil-
ity. 00 In Keith v. Volpe, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed a lower court's ruling for
plaintiffs in an action under Title VIll,
even though the plaintiffs did not present
direct proof of an intent to discrimi-
note. 01 The court qualified its opinion,
however, saying it had not decided if
"discriminatory effect" alone was
enough.'o2 Title Vil has the potential to
be a powerful tool for plaintiffs, although
few courts have answered all of the
" Id. 11I43-44.
19 Id.aot 11 50.
90 Id. at 1 147.
91 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
9 See Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MicH. [. REv. 394, 410 (1991).
93 R.I.S.E., Inc., 768 F.Supp. at 1143.
9 Lazarus, supro note 1, at 830.
9s Mto. Cos. of 1945, an. 1, § 2.
* Iing v. Swenson, 423 S.W.2d 699, 705 (1968). The Missouri Supreme Cour stated that the purpose of both Ihe federal and Missouri equal protection
clauses was to "prevent invidious discrimination." In Arlington Heights, the U.S. Supreme Court said discriminatory intent was required to prove invidious
di criminaion. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
I7 tozarus, supro note 1, of 839.
" Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1988). Private cors are not immune under these suits, since there is no requirement that the defendant receive
federal financial subsidization, as required by Title VI. Lazarus, supro note 1, at 840.
1 lazarus, supra note 1, at 840.
100 1d.01t839A41.
101 K'eith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467(9h Cir. 1988).
1 id. at 482.
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interpretive questions Title Vill has
raised.10
C. Title VI
Title VI states that: "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial
assistance.""' The critical difference
between Title VI and the vastly unsuc-
cessful Equal Protection Clause is that
plaintiffs generally are not required to
show intent to discriminate.ios Although
the United States Supreme Court has
been unclear on this issue at times,'" a
Title VI suit has a better chance of escap-
ing the intent requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment cases. Professor
Lazarus believes that allowing discrimi-
notory impact to sustain a Title VI cause
of action encourages settlement. 07
When a Title VI plaintiff is able to show
a discriminatory impact, the burden theo-
retically shifts to the defendant to offer a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the site's location.io' This encourages
defendants to settle rather than meet a
shifting burden of persuasion.'
Title VI has three significant limita-
tions. First, the potential defendant class
may be limited in Title VI claims by the
"federal financial assistance" require-
ment,o10 although one commentator has
noted that most states have programs
that determine the allocation of environ-
mental "benefits and burdens," and that
many of these programs receive signifi-
cant federal financial support."' The
financial assistance requirement is analo-
gous to the "state actor" requirement in
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
claims, which may be satisfied by a
"nexus" relationship between the state
and the defendant. This vague test is
based on the case's individual circum-
stances."' Because Title VI is depend-
ent on a somewhat bright-line test as
opposed to the vague nexus standard in
Equal Protection claims, Title VI plaintiffs
may have more success in environmental
cases.
The second limitation concerns the
plaintiff's remedy." 3 Title VI appears to
have been successful in cases involving
the allocation of "municipal services."
These cases are closely related to envi-
ronmental racism cases."" The usual
remedy in the municipal services cases
has been injunctive in nature; money
damages are the exception rather than
the rule.11s Professor Lazarus speculates
that this limitation will be insignificant
because Title IX of the Education Act
Amendments of 1972 and Title VI have
similar constructions." 6  The Supreme
Court has ruled that money damages are
available in Title IX cases, suggesting
that they may likewise be available in
Title VI cases." 7
The third and most obvious limitation
on Title VI is its uncertain success in the
environmental racism context. Professor
Lazarus suggests that
courts may be more willing to
grant relief under Title VI than
under equal protection because
the focus of the lawsuit is, of
least superficially, the provision
of governmental benefits as op-
posed to the redistribution of
environmental risks. To that ex-
tent, a Title VI lawsuit is more
analogous to equal protection
challenges concerning provision
of municipal services ... than to
those suits which more overtly
seek a judicial redistribution of
'harmful' environmental risks."'
It is difficult to separate the concept of
"benefits" in a Title VI environmental
"os Another alternative for those who have been slighed in the allocation of housing may be 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Helen Hershkoff, Environmental Equity: The NewFrontier of Civil liberties, 2 LAND UsE FoRum 23, 26 (Winter 1993). Again, the threshold of proof needed to meet the intent requirement is unknown, but those
minority communities that have suffered lowered property values deriving from the siting of disposal and landfitl facilities may find a cause of action here. Id. at 26.The statute arguably creates a property right in property values that cannot be abrogated by either the public or private actor. Id.Along the same lines, the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment has been suggested as the basis of a cause of action by some commentators. Id. The problemswith the takings douse are: 1) state action is required; 21 the field of possible defendants; and 3) the extent to which a property right will be within the protection ofthe Fifth Amendment. Id. Theoretically, a plaintiff may argue that a Fifth Amendment property right includes a sustainable level of property values, freedom from con-tominated water and air, or even freedom from the stench of a nearby landfill. Id. The takings clause is, like Title Vill, an untried weapon in the environmental equitycontext and its worth is unknown.
'0 42 U.S.C. § 20001d) (1988).
1os Lazarus, supro note 1, at 834. (citing Lou v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
'" Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2 (1983) (three justices found that Title VI still required proof of intent, but gave deference tothe agency's view requiring only disparate impact. So even if this view prevails in future cases, the EPA has only to set a disparate impact standard as its policy tosustain a Title VI claim).
o' Lazarus, supro note 1, of 838, n.234.
100 Id.
'm Id.
no id. at 835.
11 Id.
"1 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
"1t Lazarus, supro note 1, of 836.
"4 See Beon, 482 F.Supp. at 673
s Id.
"6 Lazarus, supro note 1, at 836.
":' Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnel County Pub. Schs., 112 S. C. 1028(19921).
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racism action from the concept of
"judicial redistribution" of environmental
risks in an equal protection-based ac-
tion. In either case, the same conflict
exists. On the one hand, fairness dic-
tales an equitable sharing by the popula-
tion as a whole of the burdens created
by hazardous wastes in our society. On
the other hand, judicial restraint prevents
the judicial branch from invading the
legislatures' domain of allocating socie-
ties' benefits and burdens. The success
of Title VI cases, as in many other areas
of the law, will depend on whether the
court hearing the case is an activist court
or prefers to defer to the appropriate leg-
islative body. However, given the recent
push by Congress, the White House,
and the EPA to actively curb environ-
mental racism, the chances for a success-
ful Title VI claim may never be better.
V. CONcLusIoN
The previous discussion suggests
three related conclusions: 1) Lawsuits
filed by or on behalf of people who
claim to have suffered harm due to dis-
criminatory waste facility siting practices
will increase in number in the future; 2)
these lawsuits increasingly will allege
Title VI violations; and 3) Title VI plain-
tiffs have some likelihood of being able
to sustain their complaints based on a
showing of disparate impact alone.
However, several questions remain. An-
swers to these questions will be crucial
to the outcome of these cases and will
significantly affect waste management
policy decisions in the United States.
A. Income
Minority groups in this country are
poorer, based on percentage of
population, than the majority white
population.' 19  Notwithstanding the
"one man, one vote" principle of politi-
cal equality, a certain political advan-
toge exists in the democratic process for
those participants with greater spending
power. Given these two assumptions, a
plaintiff may have difficulty challenging a
hazardous waste siting policy as dis-
criminatory when that plaintiff is both a
member of a minority group and poor.
A court may require a showing that the
hazardous waste site was created in
that plaintiff's neighborhood solely be-
cause of the plaintiff's race. It may be
that the site location was chosen based
on the lack of political spending power
of the community instead of on that com-
munity's racial composition. Title VI
does not include in its list of protected
classes those below the poverty line.
B. Other Contributing Causes
Minorities are more susceptible than
whites to a variety of medical conditions
due to differences in the places they live,
their diets, and their work conditions.i 20
A plaintiff may not win a lawsuit for
damages for a medical condition the
plaintiff claims results from living near a
hazardous waste site. A court may find
convincing the defense's statistical evi-
dence that the plaintiff's injury may also
have been caused by the plaintiff's poor
diet or working conditions. In sum, cau-
sation is still problematic in Title VI cases.
C. Timing
Does it matter whether the area was
first a minority community and then the
site for a hazardous waste facility or if
the area was first a hazardous waste
site and then became a minority
community? The few studies correlating
waste sites with population have not
considered the population breakdown at
the time the siting decisions were
made.121
A court may not hold accountable a
corporation or government entity that
sited a waste facility in a deserted area
or racially neutral area that later became
a predominantly minority community.
This situation could occur when the
waste site leads to lower property val-
ues, subsequent "white flight," and then
an increased minority population in the
area. As a defense, this "coming to the
nuisance" doctrine may not prevail since
a majority of jurisdictions no longer rec-
ognize its worth.122
D. Community Involvement
Charles J. McDermott, Director of
Government Affairs for Waste Manage-
ment, Inc., notes that while community
involvement is important in siting poli-
cies, too much community involvement
may have undesirable results. 23  Mr.
McDermott fears that "[ilf the risks of
hosting waste facilities are routinely ex-
aggerated, it is likely that only the voice-
less will play host to such necessary
activities."124  He argues that hazard-
ous waste has to go somewhere, and
competing communities will fight to keep
the waste out of their area. 12s Assuming
someone will have to win and someone
will have to lose, the poorer and minority
communities are likely to be the losers.
This argument certainly has merit, but
having limited community involvement is
certainly preferable to a situation where
the siting decision is made in a political
back-room without any significant com-
munity input.
s Id. at 839.
"'Id. at 795.
2o Id. at 806.
III CharlesiJ. McDermott, A Waste Manager's Perspective, 2 LAo USE FoRum 12, 14 (Winter 1993).
122 Fischer v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 774 F.Supp 616, 620 (W.D. Oklo. 19891; Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F.Supp 1259, 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 19821
(deccribing the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine as an outdated defense relected in the majority of jurisdictions).
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E. Settlement
Professor Lazarus believes the use of
Title VI will encourage settlement of envi-
ronmental racism suits.' 26 If this is true,
the question arises as to whether settle-
ment is a desirable result. Conceivably,
a minority plaintiff could settle with the
defendant corporation or government
entity for reduced damages because the
plaintiff needs the money or does not
have the finances to continue the lawsuit.
As a result, sites may not be moved or
shut down, and defendants may not be
publicly forced to accept responsibility,
thereby proliferating discriminatory siting
policies. These defendants may be will-
ing to accept the risk of a lawsuit that
can be quickly and quietly settled out of
court rather than spending the time and
effort to consider minority groups in their
siting decisions.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
RCRA does not require TSDs to be
equally distributed among the popula-
tion.127 One simple solution to the prob-
lem of inequitable siting policies is to
amend RCRA to require EPA to consider
whether certain population groups are
being unfairly impacted by these TSDs.
Currently, RCRA requires certain informa-
tion to be submitted in a TSD permit ap-
plication: 1) the hazardous wastes to
be transported, treated, stored or dis-
posed; and 2) the site at which such
hazardous wastes will be transported,
treated, stored or disposed.128  This
writer would propose the addition of a
third statutory requirement for RCRA per-
mit applications. As amended, RCRA §
6925 should read:
(b) Each application for a per-
mit under this section shall con-
tain such information as may be
required under regulations prom-
ulgated by the Administrator,
including information respecting
(1) estimates with respect to
the composition, quantities, ...
(2) the site at which such
hazardous waste ...; and
(3) the community in which
the site in (2) will be located.
Information regarding the com-
munity shall include the ethnic,
racial, gender, age and income
characteristics of the community,
as well as any other characteris-
tics determined to be relevant
by the Administrator. Failure to
submit any required information
under this subpart will result in
the automatic rejection of the
application.
This information requirement is not an
overwhelming burden on the applicant
since it is easily obtainable in census
tract reports publicly available. Under
this proposal, Congress also should pro-
hibit the EPA from granting a permit un-
less the location of the TSD impacts
proportionately on the country's popula-
tion or unless the TSD permit is required
to protect human health and the environ-
ment. In other words, the TSDs scattered
throughout the country should reflect the
country's population. If the United States
is 80% Caucasian and 20% nonwhite,
80% of the TSDs should be in predomi-
nantly white areas and 20% of the TSDs
should be in non-white areas. EPA
should attempt to distribute TSD permits
to reflect other population characteristics
as well. This proposal is designed to
force all population groups to fairly
share the burdens associated with TSDs.
This writer's proposal also would
add a cause of action under RCRA's
citizen suit provision that would make
failure to submit this demographic infor-
mation a violation of § 6925 and thus
actionable under § 6972(a)(1).i2
Thus, if a private plaintiff meets the re-
quirements of § 6972(b), the plaintiff
may sue for injunctive relief, attorneys
fees and court costs.
Under this proposal, EPA would be
required to consider the impact on the
population surrounding the applicant
facility. As a nondiscretionary duty,
EPA's violation would be actionable un-
der § 6972(a)(2). If EPA fails to take
into account the impact on the surround-
ing population, someone in that popula-
tion has standing to bring a suit to force
EPA to reconsider the application and
recover its attorneys fees and court costs.
This proposal gives those unfairly ex-
posed to the risks associated with TSDs
a readymade cause of action that can
result in the non-issuance of the permit.
The threat of an automatic rejection for
failing to disclose the community-
characteristic information creates an in-
centive for the permit applicant to con-
sider those impacted by the proposed
facility. The problem of inequality in the
sharing of environmental burdens is a
social issue. It is important that the
decision-makers, primarily EPA, the states
and facility-owners, consider who the
TSDs are likely to impact as well as what
environmental hazards they pose. To
date, these decision-makers have not
taken a look at the "big picture." It is
time they did so. President Clinton's ex-
ecutive order takes a step in the right
direction, but does not go for enough. If
the decision-makers will not look at the
big picture on their own, it is necessary
to require them to do so through an
absolute legislative mandate, as this pro-
posal envisions.
Lazarus, supro note 1:
42 U.S.C. § 6925.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 6972.
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